where the second inequality arises because n 1 + n 2 ≤ 1. Similar reasoning demonstrates that α * 12 ≤ α * 10 . By Equations (6) and (7), n 1 + n 2 = 1. To demonstrate that both firms have positive market share, we must show that α * 12 < 1. Assume that α * 12 ≥ 1. This implies that n 1 = 1, n 2 = 0:
which is a contradiction.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, when p 1 + p 2 > (v 1 + v 2 ) − t − qL, the consumer adoption decision satisfies: n 1 + n 2 < 1 and n 2 > 0.
Proof. Reversing the proof for the first step of Lemma 3 provides: α * 10 < α * 12 < α * 20 which, by Equations (6) and (7), provides the first part of the lemma, that n 1 + n 2 < 1. Further,
t+qL . That n 2 > 0 follows from Firm 2's profit maximization since any p 2 < v 2 results in positive profit.
Proof of Proposition 2
Prices follow from Lemma 5 below, and market shares follow from Equations (6) and (7).
Lemma 5. Firm i's best response for any price of Firm j is given by
Proof. From Proposition 1 and Equations (6) and (7), we know that:
The corresponding derivatives of Firm 1's profit with respect to its price are:
The regions are numbered for ease of discourse. Profit is increasing over Region 1. Inspection of the derivatives reveals four possibilities: (i) profit is decreasing in Regions 2 and 3, (ii) profit is single-peaked in the interior of Region 2 and decreasing in Region 3, (iii) profit is increasing in Region 2 and decreasing in Region 3, and (iv) profit is increasing in Region 2 and is singlepeaked in Region 3. These correspond to the first four cases in the lemma. In the fifth case, 
Proof of Theorems
The following lemma, defining conditions under which equilibrium profit is increasing in q, is used in the proofs of the theorems.
Lemma 6. For j ∈ {1, 2},
where π * j and π * j are the highest and lowest obtainable equilibrium profits for firm j.
which is positive whenever: q >
t+qL . Differentiating with respect to q yields:
By Equation (9c), the set of prices that can yield either the highest or lowest equilibrium payoffs
In the first two cases, dp 1 dq = 0 and Equation (A-1) is negative. In the last two cases, Equation (A-1) becomes:
To complete the proof, we show that the part in brackets is positive.
for all q ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemma 6, we have that
. By Lemma 6, we have that
for all q ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemma 6, we
Proof of Theorem 2. By Proposition 2:
and
For part (i) of the theorem, to have n 2 = 0 when q = 0, we need 0 ≤
we require that 1 >
. These conditions are equivalent to:
Proof of Theorem 3. Define q ≡ max[0,
] and q ≡ min[1,
]. Clearly, q ≥ 0 and q ≤ 1 and, by Lemma 6, profit is increasing whenever q ∈ (q, q). To show that q < q we require:
which correspond to the conditions of part (i) of the theorem. The conditions in part (ii) imply
Therefore,
which, by Lemma 6, implies profit is increasing for all q.
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We next consider the generality of the above results, by specifying a quadratic attack probability function which includes linearity as a special case.
Corollary 3 (quadratic attack probability). Define Proof. The consumer indifferent between Firm 1 and Firm 2 is found by solving:
Since all consumers derive strictly positive utility when q = 0, by assumption, we must have n e 1 + n e 2 = 1 when q is sufficiently small. Equation (A-3) becomes:
In equilibrium, it must be the case that α * 12 = n 1 = n e 1 . Substituting into (A-4) yields
For the above to have an interior solution (0 < n 1 < 1), we must have:
We will confirm these conditions shortly. First, equilibrium prices are obtained by differentiating π j = p j n j for each firm and solving the simultaneous equations. This yields:
The conditions in (A-6) are satisfied whenever t + qL > 1 3 (v 1 − v 2 ) which is true by assumption (condition i ). Combining (A-5) and (A-7) yields profits of:
which is increasing in q whenever t >
Proof of Theorem 4. Condition (i) guarantees that the profit function is initially increasing in q. In particular, it implies that
which, by Lemma 6, implies that
If the profit function is initially nonincreasing, then there are two possibilities by Lemma 6. As q increases, either profit is initially nonincreasing, then increasing; or it is nonincreasing, then increasing, then decreasing:
(ii-a) nonincreasing-increasing: By Lemma 6, for profits to be nonincreasing when q = 0 and increasing when q = 1, the following conditions are required:
Firm 2's profit is 0 at q = 0, thus Firm 2's profit is maximized at q = 1. For Firm 1, maximum profit occurs either at q = 0 or q = 1 and, by Proposition 2, these are given by:
Profit at q = 1 is strictly greater than profit at q = 0 when
Condition (A-9) is redundant as it is implied by (A-13). However, for both (A-13) and (A-10) to be satisfied, it must also be the case that Combining these conditions:
(ii-b) nonincreasing-increasing-decreasing: By Lemma 6, we require:
Maximum profit can occur either at q = 0 or at q =
which is the point above which profit is again decreasing in q. Firm 1's profit is given by:
This profit exceeds the profit at q = 0 given by (A-11) if t > v 2 1 −3v 2 2 3(v 1 +v 2 ) which is precisely the condition in (A-14) . Combining these conditions, we have: Following steps similar to Propositions 1 and 2, under the conditions in the theorem, we have n 1 > 0, n 2 > 0, n 1 + n 2 = 1 for all q 1 and q 2 . Since, in equilibrium, n e i = n i , we have
For given q 1 and q 2 , firms maximize π i (p i ) = p i n i which yields the first order conditions: -22) 
